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This paper is an empirical critique of Barry Eichengreen's interpretation of
the exceptional growth performance of Western Europe during the 1950s and
1960s. The main part of the paper shows that, at least for the important case of
West Germany, Eichengreen
 fs view of a broad-based economic and social
consensus as the major reason for moderate wage growth and fast capital
accumulation is hardly compatible with the facts. In particular, there is no
historical evidence an explicit or implicit tripartite deal between unions,
employers and the government to avoid problems of time-inconsistency in
commitments to wage moderation.
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0. Introduction
In two recent papers, Barry Eichengreen has advanced a particular interpretation of
the exceptional growth performance of Western Europe during the early
post World-War H-period, i.e. roughly the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s.
1 In
essence, he argues that, in the majority of countries and in the more successful ones
at that, there was a broad-based economic and social consensus, backed up by appro-
priate internal and external institutions, which brought about moderate wage settle-
ments, an exceptionally high rate of capital accumulation and thus sustained eco-
nomic growth.
2 In this view, the post-war European growth spurt is largely regarded
as the result of a conscious corporatist effort.
This paper is a critical comment on Eichengreen's interpretation, or more precisely:
on that part of his interpretation which is concerned with the role of an internal con-
sensus as a growth-enhancing factor. (I largely bypass the positive role of interna-
tional cooperation which I take to be much less controversial.) In part 1 of the paper,
I summarise Eichengreen's argument. In part 2, the core of the paper, I confront the
theory with empirical facts; in doing so, I focus on the West German experience,
which necessarily forms a major part of Eichengreen's (or any other) explanatory ac-
count of the growth record in the relevant period of European history.
1. The Eichengreen-View
According to Eichengreen (1994a, b), the economic logic of West European era of
fast economic growth can be summarised as follows.
1 See Eichengreen (1994a,b).
2 The punchline of Eichengreen's interpretation is not new, it goes back to Maier (1975).
However, Eichengreen can be credited for having put Maier's idea into a more coherent
theoretical framework. Parts of the interpretation can also be found in many studies of individual
countries, one of the earliest being Wallich (1955) on the West German economic revival.-2-
There are two 'proximate causes' - in the sense Maddison (1991) coined this term - for
the exceptional performance: pure catch-up vis-a-vis the United States (Abramovitz
1986) and high investment. While catch-up can be taken to be almost self-explana-
tory
3, investment is itself an endogenous phenomenon that raises deeper questions:
Why was high investment possible and what made it so productive? In Eichengreen's
view, the proximate answers are: wage moderation and export growth, which are
again to be explained and, at this point, consensual arrangements and institutions
come in.
As to wage moderation, Eichengreen holds that, unlike in other historical periods, la-
bour and capital succeeded in reaching a cooperative solution to the standard bargain-
ing game of dynamic welfare maximisation: in essence, labour agreed to defer current
consumption in return for higher future consumption that was to be made possible by
high investment financed through high profits. To be sure, this is an unusual outcome:
theory tells us that a cooperative solution to this type of dynamic game is conceivable
(Grout, 1984; van der Ploeg, 1987), but not very likely to come about because the
solution is time inconsistent, i.e. both sides in the game have an incentive to renege
on prior commitments once the other side has fulfilled (implicit) contractual
obligations. E.g., labour unions may promise to restrain wages to allow for invest-
ment, but once investment has taken place they have an incentive to renege on their
promise and appropriate the maximum quasi rent; anticipating this outcome, capital
and management may refrain from committing themselves to higher investment and
disburse profits instead. Hence institutions are needed that in some way enforce the
commitment through whatever legal, political or social means.
3 Strictly speaking, catch-up in the sense of closing a technological 'idea gap' (Romer 1993) is of
course not self-explanatory because it presupposes a theory of international knowledge diffusion
via trade, direct investment or other links that may be highly controversial. However, for the
question at hand, the empirical relevance of catch-up is well confirmed, although its precise
magnitude - and the extent to which it is really 'separable' from other factors like, e.g., high
investment - may be open to doubt.-3-
The relevant questions then become: What were these institutions at the time? And in
addition: Why did they work in this particular historical period and not in others? And
why did they not last longer, say, up to the late 1960s? In essence, Eichengreen's an-
swers to these questions come down to one catchword: corporatism. In his view, the
prototypical post-World War II European government adjusted the legislative
framework in a way that gave both employers and unions a maximum incentive first
to commit themselves to a cooperative solution of the dynamic game and second to
honour the relevant commitment. It did so by an array of institutional innovations that
were introduced to varying degrees in different countries; these involved (i) the con-
certation (and to some extent centralisation) of collective bargaining through gov-
ernment intervention, partly enriched by some kind of 'social compact' for investment
and growth, (ii) an extension of worker consultation or even 'co-determination' on the
plant level, and/or (iii) a widening and deepening of the welfare state.
Why did these consensual arrangements break down eventually or lose their effects
on wage moderation? Eichengreen's answer - arrived at via a kind of negative selec-
tion of explanations like 'Olsonian capture', the oil price shocks and the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods system -
4 focuses on the increase of international capital mobility
that accentuated the problems of time inconsistency by weakening the causal link
between wage moderation and subsequent investment: as management had increas-
ingly the option of investing profits abroad, domestic labour could not be assured that
a sacrifice today would translate into higher income tomorrow. To meet these new
challenges, a quite drastic adjustment of institutions might have been necessary by
the late 1960s; however, unlike in the early post-war period with its large-scale dislo-
cation of institutions, history did not provide an opportunity for a (second) major ad-
justment of economic, political and social arrangements, which reveal a kind of natu-
4 See Eichengreen (1994b), pp. 37-43.-4-
ral inertia once they have been established and successfully working for a significant
period of time.
As to export growth, Eichengreen identifies a time inconsistency problem analogous
to the one concerning wage moderation: to reap the long-run benefits of European
trade integration and to keep down political groups lobbying against it, there had to
be a firm international commitment to irreversible liberalisation that made it profit-
able to incur the short-run costs of industrial restructuring. The various forms of in-
ternational cooperation that were institutionalised in the late 1940s and early 1950s
did exactly meet this need: intra-European trade was greatly facilitated by creating the
clearing mechanism of the EPU (supported by Marshall plan aid), by setting up the
ECSC, which committed Germany to giving the French steel industry access to the
coal reserves in the Ruhr valley, and by a GATT process that allowed intraregional
trade preferences as long as they did not entail a rise of trade barriers vis-a-vis the rest
of the world.
2. Eichengreen's Theory and the West German Facts
In one of the two relevant papers
5, Barry Eichengreen presents a broad assortment of
facts in support of his interpretation of post-war economic history. As to the internal
side of his argument (the only side that concerns us here!), the bulk of these facts is
taken from a number of smaller European countries, which are shown to reveal quite
a few of the relevant traits characterising a system of consensual corporatism. From
the four large countries (West Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom), only
West Germany is explicitly taken as a case in point all throughout; France and Italy
are considered as late converts to consensual corporatism, and the United Kingdom as
none at all.
See EichengTeen (1994b).-5-
All this has curious consequences for what may be called the coverage of the evi-
dence (see Table 1 in the appendix). The group of small nations - in Table 1 called
'Group A' and consisting of Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and four Scandinavian
countries - covered in 1950 no more than 19 per cent of the relevant population total.
Only if the case of the largest single country West Germany can be included in the
evidence may the Eichengreen view be taken as an interpretation for a relevant chunk
(roughly 40 per cent) of the whole. Even then, however, it would still be a somewhat
limited explanation as long as it does not fully account for the growth experience of
the two major Romanic countries which, apart from Britain (and Ireland), have to be
taken as the ones with the least developed consensual corporatism in post-war we-
stern Europe.
6 As the two right-hand columns of Table 1 indicate, both France and
Italy had well-above average productivity growth in the 1950s and the 1960s, which
does not square well with a theory featuring corporatist institutions.
Be that as it may, the case of West Germany has obvious importance for the scope
and validity of Eichengreen's interpretation: (i) West Germany is the largest of all
countries under consideration and, centrally located as it happens to be, a very impor-
tant trading partner to most of the rest, (ii) Unlike Britain, France and Italy, it is
commonly regarded as having an economy with strong European-style corporatist
characteristics, (iii) And its exceptional economic performance in the post-war period
is beyond any doubt, reaching by far the fastest productivity growth in the 1950s and
still average growth in 1960-73, the 'Golden age' of most other countries (see
Table 1). hi short: only if the case of West Germany supports the argument can the
Eichengreen interpretation be taken as accounting for more than a fringe phenomenon
that prevailed in the smaller northern, western and central European countries.
6 In this respect, Eichengreen does not deviate from the international rankings of corporatism that
other writers have set up (i.a. Bruno, Sachs 1985; Calmfors, Driffill 1987). Usually, the
Romanic countries are categorised as the least corporatist in western Europe, roughly on a par
with Britain and Ireland.-6-
A 'test' of Eichengreen's theory for the case of West Germany essentially consists of
giving answers to a sequence of empirical questions. Was there wage moderation in
the 1950s and 1960s? If so, was there a corporatist agreement supporting it? And, if
not, was there at least an implicit tripartite deal between the government and the two
parties in collective bargaining which delivered the long-term bonding that was re-
quired to overcome the problem of inter temporal inconsistency? We shall tentatively
answer these questions below.
2.1. Evidence on Wage Moderation
By historical standards, wages grew fast in Germany during the 1950s and 1960s (see
Table 2 in the appendix): the nominal wage (defined here as average gross yearly
earnings of an employee) increased by 7.9 per cent p.a. in 1950-60 and 8.6 per cent
p.a. in 1960-70, the real wage (defined as the nominal wage divided by the con-
sumption deflator) increased by 6.0 and 5.8 per cent respectively. However, given the
fast labour productivity growth, the rise of unit labour cost remained moderate:
2.2 per cent p.a. in 1950-60 and 4.3 per cent p.a. in 1960-70. And real unit labour
cost, i.e. (nominal) labour cost divided by the value added deflator, declined by 0.9
per cent p.a. in 1950-60 and rose mildly by 0.4 per cent p.a. in 1960-70, with this rise
being largely due to the once-for-all sharp wage hike in the final year 1970 of the
sample period.
Table 3 (in the appendix) presents a more detailed picture of the pattern of real unit
labour cost (RULC) and its various components in the relevant periods. It confirms
that, as a whole, the 1950s were a time of declining labour costs. This holds for both
the first and the second half of the decade, with the decline being somewhat more
dramatic in the earlier years than in the later ones. Looking over the yearly changes of
RULC, we can see that a rough cyclical pattern emerges, with marked decreases in
the upswings 1950/1, 1954/5 and again 1958-60, and only slight increases in-bet-
ween-Note that the ratio of the deflators of value added and consumption PV/PC
(column 5 in Table 3) follows a very similar inter temporal pattern as RULC, albeit in-7-
reverse: all major RULC decreases have a counterpart in substantial increases of
PV/PC, and both columns reveal a clear-cut cyclical pattern. In economic terms, this
means that - de facto - wage settlements allowed firms to keep their terms-of-trade
gains as profits for investment purposes.
For the 1960s, Table 3 shows a somewhat different picture: as a whole, the ten years
from 1960 to 1969 were a time of virtually constant aggregate labour cost, but cycli-
cal fluctuations were significant, with increases in 1960-63 and 1964-66 being com-
pensated by sharp decreases in 1963-64 and 1966-69. Not before the watershed year
1970 did a sustained rise of RULC set in and last until roughly the mid-1970s. From
this - and from more sophisticated measures of 'wage gaps' for these periods -
7 one
can conclude that the 1950s, but not quite the 1960s, were a period of persistent wage
moderation inWest Germany.
The numbers in Table 3, which are based on national accounts statistics, do not con-
tain information on whether the wage changes were due to collective agreements
between unions and employers' associations (or individual employers) or to the op-
eration of market forces. A tentative measure that discriminates between these two
elements is the 'wage distance
1, here defined as the percentage difference of the actual
hourly earnings (w
e, 'e' for 'Effektiv') and the hourly minimum wage (w*, 't' for 'Tarif)
of an industrial worker.
8 As collective agreements in Germany are strictly confined to
set minimum standards of remuneration,
9 the inter temporal development of the wage
7 See Paque" (forthcoming), Chapter II. Wage gap measures have the advantage that, in theory,
they purge the data of the induced productivity effect due to variations of the employment level,
which is particularly important for times with fast employment growth (as the 1950s). Under
standard neoclassical assumptions, the measures of RULC presented in the text underestimate (in
absolute terms) the decline of a 'true' measure of labour cost because they do not take into
account the decline of average labour productivity induced by integrating marginal employees.
On the other hand, wage gap measures usually suffer from a host of restrictive assumptions
concerning the economy's production technology.
8 For details of definition, see Paque (forthcoming), Chapter IV.
9 See Paque (1993a) for further institutional details.distance in the medium term can be taken as a rough proxy for the change of impor-
tance of market forces relative to collective bargaining.
Figure 1 (in the appendix) presents this rough proxy, with w
e and w* defined as indi-
ces that are set equal for the base year 1951.
1
0 The figure shows nicely that there was
a trend increase of wage distance all over the 1950s and 1960s, interrupted only by
the two (major) business downturns around 1958 and 1967. By the late 1960s, the
wage distance as measured here-reached roughly 15-20 per cent, a range which then
remained roughly unchanged until the most recent past. Over the same time periods,
the unemployment rate changed quite dramatically, from about 10 per cent in 1950
down to about 1 per cent all over the 1960s except the recession 1966/67 (see Fig-
ure 2). In view of these facts, even the 1960s may be tentatively classified as a period
of wage moderation properly understood: while aggregate RULC did not decline
anymore after 1960, contractual agreements were moderate enough to allow market-
determined wage increases to surpass contractual minima by a considerable margin,
and to do so over longer periods of time.
2.2. Corporatist Agreements on Wage Restraint
At the basis of collective bargaining in post-war West Germany lay the so-called
principle of Tarifautonomie, i.e. of autonomous wage bargaining between unions and
employers (or employers associations) without any government interference. This
principle was legally established and protected by the Collective Agreements Act
(Tarifvertragsgesetz) of April 1949, which formally ended the period of wage con-
trols by the Allied forces.
1
1 In a broader historical perspective, the principle replaced
the softer form of autonomous wage bargaining that prevailed in the Weimar Repub-
1
0 Note that this does not imply that w
e and w* were actually equal in 1951.
1
1 The wage freeze was formally ended earlier, in October 1948, three months after the currency
reform. Even before, wage controls were not strictly enforced, but (ad-hoc) collective
agreements took place on the plant level.-9-
lic, which allowed for and even prescribed compulsory arbitration under government
auspices in well-defined situations of bargaining stalemates.
1
2 It was precisely the
memory of the (unhappy) experience with compulsory arbitration in the 1920s that
made the post-war legislator decide to keep the government strictly out of collective
bargaining;
1
3 and no discernible political controversy arose on this issue.
1
4
There are probably very few countries where the principle of (government-free) wage
bargaining has been so jealously guarded by the bargaining parties, notably by the
industrial unions, as in post-World War II West Germany. It is quite safe to say that,
at no time since the late 1940s, there was a remote chance of achieving anything like
an explicit tripartite agreement between government, unions and employers' associa-
tions that could have been binding for the relevant parties at the numerous industrial
and firm-specific bargaining tables. If 'binding' is to mean legally enforceable, this is
obvious enough. However, even if the term is to mean binding in a political sense of
a gentlemen agreement on wage policy that involves top representatives of all three
sides, it is hard to come up with examples, except maybe for the late 1960s, the last
quarter of the period under consideration.
Until the mid-1960s, there was no formal or informal framework in which a corpora-
tist coordination of wage policy could have taken shape: to my knowledge, not a
single tripartite meeting involving top officials of unions, employers and the govern-
ment and concerned with macroeconomic policy took place until February 1967,
when the so-called Concerted Action, a brain child of the then Minister of Economics
1
2 For a historical evaluation of compulsory arbitration in the 1920s, see Hartwich (1967) and Biihr
(1989).
1
3 See Paque (1993a), pp.211-2. Only in very narrowly defined circumstances coming close to a
national emergency does the government have the right (and the obligation) to replace collective
agreements by public decree. So far, no such situation has come about.
1
4 E.g., the Advisory Council to the Federal Minister of Economics, which - through its various
'reports' (see Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 1973) - played an important role in laying the intellectual
ground for the concept of a 'Social Market Economy' in the months before and after the currency
reform of June 1948, did at no point discuss the issue.- 10-
Karl Schiller, gathered for the first time.
1
5 With some justification, the Concerted Ac-
tion and the subsequent wage moderation may be credited for helping to pull the
German economy out of the sharp recession 1966/67 and to initiate a non-inflationary
recovery (although no 'political' wage guidelines were issued!); beyond this cyclical
gain, however, it did hardly have long-lasting beneficial effects as the very sharp
wage increases in the early 1970s indicate (see Table 3).
1
6 hi any case, the Concerted
Action came much too late in the game to explain more than a very small part of
post-war wage moderation;
1
7 and it lasted in an institutionalised form until 1977, thus
covering almost precisely the decade that is commonly viewed as the one with the
strongest upward pressure on wages and labour costs in Germany until the present.
In view of these facts, it would be mistaken to view post-war Germany as anything
like an example of corporatist coordination of wage policy. If anything, it could be
characterised up to the mid 1960s as a case of strictly independent industrial, wage
bargaining with a significant and persistent anti-inflationary moral suasion by four
institutions outside collective bargaining, namely (i) the Federal Ministry of Econom-
ics, from 1949 to 1963 headed by Ludwig Erhard, the popular liberal/conservative
'father of the German Economic Miracle', who was renowned for issuing so-called
pleas for moderation (Mafihalteappelle) whenever a business upswing threatened to
turn into an inflationary hike, (ii) the independent central bank, which made un-
equivocal statements of stability-orientation at major boom peaks (e.g. in 1956 and
1960) and thus clarified that a monetary accommodation of an aggressive wage pol-
1
5 I disregard here the tripartite meetings taking place in 1951 that were part of the negotiations
concerning the prospective law on co-determination in the iron and steel industry. They did not
concern wage bargaining and macroeconomic policy directly. We shall return to this matter
below in Section 2.3.
1
6 Epr^an evaluation of the Concerted Action strategy in the 1967 recession, see Giersch, Paque,
Schmieding (1992), pp. 148-50.
1
7 .While the idea of some sort of coordinated macroeconomic policy (including wage guidelines)
had;been around since the five-member Council of Economic Experts had been established in
1963, its actual implementation into political practice took another four years. On the Council's
concepts in detail, see Giersch, Paque, Schmieding (1992), pp. 139-50.-11-
icy was out of the question, (iii) a large and influential part of the press, i.e. in par-
ticular a phalanx of conservative and liberal quality papers which fully supported the
stability-oriented policy stance of the government and the central bank, often against
pressures from unions and populist politicians, and (iv) the Advisory Council to the
Minister of Economics who gave academic backing to the prevailing policy stance in
its ad-hoc reports on selected policy questions that were issued at irregular intervals
and received considerable public attention. In none of these 'institutions' did the trade
union movement take any active part during the relevant period.
1
8
By the international standards of the time, the attempts at moral suasion were cer-
tainly frequent and intense, and in boom periods, they culminated in clusters of anti-
inflationary warnings directed at a general public of wage earners and consumers.
This has tempted some hindsight observers to classify some of the calls for modera-
tion and stability as a German-style variant of incomes policy.
1
9 This interpretation is
seriously misleading: it neglects the essentially unilateral character of the calls which
all came from mutually independent sources of what may be called the lib-
eral/conservative establishment. They lacked the constituent element of incomes
policies, namely the explicit or implicit policy coordination of all relevant sides of the
macroeconomic game. At any rate, they are far off the 'institutional bonding' that
Eichengreen (1994a, b) describes as a necessary condition to overcome the inter tem-
poral inconsistency problem faced by collective bargaining in post-war Europe.
2.3. Broader Bonding Mechanisms
It appears to be impossible to rigorously 'test' the Eichengreen-proposition that insti-
tutional reforms and political changes were major forces coaxing labour and capital
into a cooperative solution to their dynamic game of welfare maximisation: other than
direct agreements on wage restraint, the causality running from the general legal
1
8 For details, see Giersch, Paque, Schmieding (1992), pp. 62-68.
1
9 See, e.g., Ulman, Flanagan (1971), pp. 185-86; Flanagan, Soskice, Ulman (1983), pp. 275-79.-12-
framework and general economic and social conditions to the concrete outcome of
wage settlements is so complex to defy any attempt at consistent modelling or even
story-telling. Inevitably, much will remain in the murky zone of speculation. At this
point, we confine our 'test' to an evaluation whether at least the main thrust of
Eichengreen's argument is consistent with the broad pattern of relevant facts.
We structure this tentative 'test' by asking three questions for post-World War II-
West Germany: (a) Was there a shift from confrontational to consensual policy-mak-
ing to integrate the union movement into political decision-making? (b) Was there a
likewise shift towards labour participation on the plant level? (c) Were there welfare
state extensions to buy off union support?
(a) Consensual Policy-Making?
There are a number of established facts and uncontroversial historical interpretations
that help to answer this question:
[i] The major post-war economic reform steps in and around the currency reform of
June 1948, notably the large package of liberalisation measures, came about without
political participation and consultation of the unions. Conceptually, they were the
brainchild of the later Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard and a number of neoliberal
economists; politically, they received their support from the conservative/liberal ma-
jority in the 'Economic Council' (Wirtschaftsrat) in Frankfurt, the forerunner of the
later West German parliament. In the decisive two years after the reforms, the unions
remained - together with the political opposition of the Social Democrats - strongly
critical of the government economic policy, though they did not go as far as to stage
any major political counterattacks. The reasons for the unions' cautiousness was a
combination of two factors, namely first their temporary weakness due to lack of
strike funds and the power limbo until a new umbrella organisation was founded in
October 1949, and second the apparent popularity of the government's economicits fur We
-13-
policy stance, which also led to a victory of the conservative and liberal coalition in
the first Federal elections of September 1949.
2
0
[ii] Until the mid 1950s - and in a somewhat more moderate form until the early
1960s - the union movement as represented by the DGB and the most powerful indus-
trial unions remained highly critical of the actual government policies and of the un-
cooperative stance of the employers' associations. In this respect, it is helpful to recall
the rough sequence of events.
The unions' Basic Programme (Grundsatzprogramm) passed at the founding congress
of the DGB in Munich in October 1949 stated ambitious syndicalist aims culminating
in the establishment of macroeconomic councils (Wirtschaftsrdte) which should be
appointed on a parity basis by employers and unions and vested with far-reaching
competences and powers in terms of directing investment (Investitionslenkung).
21
Being set up on the eve of the subsequent co-determination debate, which became
unavoidable for the government due to the running out of special Allied provisions
for co-determination in the iron and steel industry, the Munich programme remained
politically relevant for the full three years of the actual co-determination debate. None
of the unions' macroeconomic aims of syndicalism could be reached because the




All over the first half of the 1950s - and with rising vigour after the co-determination
debate petered out in 1952 - the unions campaigned for an aggressive wage policy to
correct the emerging distributional asymmetry as evident in aggregate statistics on the
labour share in national income. The drumfire of this campaign was given by the
2
0 For details, see Giersch, Paque, Schmieding (1992), pp. 36-44.
2
1 For details of the programme, which also included demands for the nationalisation of heavy
industries, see Muller (1990), pp. 95-96.
2
2 For the details of the unions' fight for the syndicalist aims, see Muller (1990), pp. 97-111.-14-
charismatic Marxist economist Viktor Agartz, until the mid 1950s chairman of the
unions' Economic Research Institute, who put forward a theory of consumer demand-
led growth,-which was enthusiastically endorsed in union circles and fiercely
criticised by the conservative/liberal establishment.
2
3 On the other hand, the two ma-
jor; incidents of industrial action for higher wages - the metalworker strikes in Hesse
qf September 1951 and in Bavaria of August 1954 - were regarded at least as partial
failures, even within the unions: a relatively high share of workers voted against ac-
cepting the bargaining compromise, and union officials expressed openly their dis-
appointment and frustration with the outcome, putting the blame on the intransigence
and lack of cooperative spirit of the employers' side.
2
4 At the same time, there were
clear indications that, in the prevailing climate of fast growth, tough industrial action
was not very popular: public opinion and the press showed little sympathy and sup-
port for the strikes, the Federal elections of September 1953 brought a landslide vic-
tory for the conservative/liberal coalition and thus full backing for their economic
policy package, and union membership continued to stagnate despite the fast rise of
employment.
By the mid-1950s, the apparent lack of popularity of the union movement led promi-
nent union officials to rethink the ideological opposition to the market economy and
to make a strong plea for a much more pragmatic stance, which gained ground over
the next few years. The Munich programme gradually turned into a dead ietter and
was first superseded by a more moderate and down-to-earth Programme for Action
(Aktionsprogramm) in 1955 and eventually replaced by a more moderate Basic Pro-
gramme in 1963, which formally opened the door to the corporatist experiments like
the Concerted Action in the late 1960s. It is generally held that the first really popular
campaign of post-war unionism was the demand of the metalworkers' union for the
five-day- or 45-hour working week, which emerged in 1956 as an indirect conse-
2
3 See Giersch, Paque, Schmieding (1992), pp. 76-77.
2
4 See Miiller (1990), pp. 119-22, 139-40; DGB, Die Quelle (1951), pp. 515-16, (1954), 394-95.-15-
quence of the aims set in the DGB-Programme for Action of 1955. There was also a
gradual transition of union leadership: towards the end of the 1950s, major positions
including the post of DGB-chairman were taken over by pragmatic union officials of
a new generation, who visibly stood for a more constructive role of unions in politics
and in the economy.
2
5
[iii] Despite their apparent self-insulation as an ideological force, the union move-
ment was not without political influence even in the early 1950s. As for most of the
time in the Weimar Republic, the Minister of Labour was a representative of the
Christian union movement, who figured as a lobbyist for labour concerns within the
government and thus as a counterweight to the much more liberally-minded Minister
of Economics. In addition, there were some prominent Christian Democratic state
politicians, notably the state premier of Northrhine-Westfalia Karl Arnold, who used
their party links to the Federal government to support union concerns. Taken as a
whole, however, the unions' political 'insider power' was clearly smaller than after
their natural political ally, the Social Democrats, entered the Federal government first
as a (junior) coalition partner in 1966 and then as (senior) partner in 1969; and it was
probably also smaller (or at least not greater) than in the 1920s when the widespread
use of compulsory arbitration under the auspices of the labour ministry gave the




The single most significant corporatist achievement of the early 1950s - and the one
taken by Eichengreen (1994b) as a paradigmatic case for consensus building in post-
war Germany - was the new legislation on labour participation on the plant level for
the iron and steel industry in 1951 and for the rest of industry in 1952. The genesis of
2
5 For an account of the gradual programmatic reorientation, see Grebing (1990).
2
6 See Bahr (1989).-16-
this legislation has been told and retold many times in German historiography,
2
7 and
we shall focus on those essential elements of the story that are relevant for the issue
at hand.
Most importantly, it is by now an uncontroversial interpretation that the outcome of
the tripartite negotiations between the government and the umbrella organisations of
the unions and the employers associations that led to the different models of co-de-
termination - the 'parity' model in the iron and steel industry, the 'one third'-labour
representation on the supervisory board of companies in the rest of industry - very
much reflected the political starting positions of the status quo ante of the times of
Allied occupation rather than the spirit of a genuine tripartite deal of 'constructive
corporatism
1.
As the British had already established a parity model in the iron and steel industry of
the Rhine/Ruhr valley, it became politically very difficult even for a conserva-
tive/liberal government to turn this back. In fact, the business wing of the coalition
government, in particular the Liberal Party, tried hard to do so, but - given the timing
of the negotiations in 1950/51 around the peak of the Korea boom- the eventual
strike threat of the unions was effective enough to enforce a compromise in January
1951. Even this compromise, which essentially consisted in a slightly watered-down
parity model at the plant level, but no institutionalised labour participation in what-
ever macroeconomic planning, passed parliament against the vote of the Liberal
Party, which did, however, remain in the government. To be sure, the spirit of these
negotiations was by no means good: only a last-minute top-level meeting of two
highly prestigious personalities - Chancellor Adenauer and DGB-chairman Hans
Bockler - cleared the path to a settlement, with the government taking more the role
of a 'compulsory arbitrator' between the unions and the employer side (to which
Adenauer had personal ties of friendship). As it emerged, the unions took the parity
2
7 See for concise summaries, i.a., Miiller (1990), pp. 109-27, and Schwarz (1981), pp. 107-10.- 17-
model in the iron and steel industry as no more than a first step in the right direction:!




The negotiations on the .'Company Statute Law' (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) in
1951/52 took a very different path: Right from the beginning, the government made
clear that the iron and steel co-determination model was to remain an exception, and
that all other branches of the economy would obtain a much more restricted version
of labour participation. The tough bargaining position of the government and the
employers side led the DGB in December 1951 to quit all cooperation with the gov-
ernment in whatever economic policy committees. In the run-up to the parliamentary
debate on the government's draft of the Company Statute Law, the unions staged a
public campaign that culminated in a series of so-called warning strikes in the print-
ing industry at the end of May 1952. The effect was virtually nil: apart from some
window dressing vis-a-vis the unions, the government passed the law in July 1952
with its parliamentary majority. Given the general public opinion, the unions appar-
ently did not dare to go any further in their resistance, just as in matters of wage
policy. In union publications, however, union voices unanimously expressed open
and sincere disappointment at the result, and a frustration at being factually excluded
from major legislation on vital labour matters.
2
9
To sum up, it is hard to view the finally enacted, strictly limited extent of labour par-
ticipation as a core part of a 'quid pro quo-package deal
1 between unions, employers
and possibly the government to moderate current wage claims and thus further capital
formation. What the evidence suggests is that the union side regarded the negotiations
and the results as unsatisfactory.
2
8 See, i.a., DGB, Die Quelle (1951), pp. 57-59.
2
9 See, i.a., DGB, Die Quelle (1952), pp. 393-95.-18-
(c) Welfare State Extensions?
There were essentially two major welfare state reforms in Germany in the relevant
period
3
0 which could serve as candidates to support Eichengreen's theses, the Law for
the Equalisation of War Burdens (Lastenausgleichsgesetz) passed in 1952
31, and the
Pension Reform Law (Rentenreformgesetz) passed in 1957
32. In all other welfare state
adjustments, the legislator remained firmly in the framework of the Weimar Republic,
which was more or less re-instituted after the end of the Nazi period and Allied
occupation.
As they were enacted, however, neither of the two welfare state innovations touched
upon collective bargaining. The equalisation of war burden in essence consisted of
imposing a one-for-all wealth tax to compensate the expellees from the former eastern
German provinces who had lost their property. To be sure, the recipients were any-
thing but a classical union clientele: a disproportionate share of them was unem-
ployed, many of them had worked in agriculture (and not in industry) before the War,
and politically they were inclined towards conservative ideologies in view of their re-
cent expulsion as ethnic Germans. In any case, they had their own lobbying organi-
sations, the 'associations of expellees' (Vertriebenenverba'nde), which were com-
pletely independent of unionism. Only in a very indirect political sense was a com-
pensation of expellees in the interest of organised labour: on balance, transferring
wealth from relatively rich West Germans to relatively poor newcomers might have
helped to mitigate the threat of a revival of radical right-wing ideas, which was ana-
thema to the union movement.
3
0 I take the relevant period here to mean the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. Thereafter,
beginning with the so-called Grand Coalition of Christian and Social Democrats, further major
reform steps were taken.
3
1 This law had a (preliminary) forerunner, the Emergency Aid Law (Soforthilfegesetz) of 1949,
which was similarly structured as the final legislation of 1952.
3
2 For a summary account of the two pieces of legislation from an economist's standpoint, see
Giersch, Paque", Schmieding (1992), 80-82.-19-
The pension reform - politically envisaged from 1953 on and eventually enacted in
1957, a few months before the Federal elections - consisted in 'dynamizing' pensions,
i.e. linking the rise of pensions to the rise of gross wages, with the link to be formally
established by an annual parliamentary decision. The reform actually led to a sharp
once-for-all increase of old-age pensions and a moderate rise of social security con-
tributions/within the pay-as-you-go system. Obviously, the main group profiting from
the reform were the pensioners, again anything like a classical union clientele. How-
ever, the reform did give unions the prospect of receiving broader support in the pub-
lic for future wage demands because, through the link of pensions to wages, pen-
sioners were apt to have a more visible stake in wage negotiations on the labour side.
Whether this indirect benefit could have served as an implicit bond in Eichengreen's
sense to restrain wage demands in the medium run remains open to speculation. In
any case, the reform happened rather late, and it was worked out in the government
without any visible union participation or influence.
2.4. Conclusions
All in all, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Eichengreen (1994b) misinterprets the
West German post-war experience: at least until the late 1950s, there is very little
evidence for explicit or implicit contracts between government, employers and unions
on wage moderation to maximise social gains in the long run.
This does not mean that the political climate between the 'social partners' was frosty
throughout. In fact, high-ranking and popular politicians of the government attended
the first two federal conventions of the unions - the economics minister Erhard in
Munich 1949 and the president Theodor Heuss in Berlin 1953 - and both received a
warm welcome. On these occasions as on others, politicians of the governing conser-
vative and liberal parties repeatedly emphasised the legitimacy of union concerns and
praised labour's (and unions') contribution to the reconstruction of the West German
economy. However, it is difficult to recognise where these more symbolic gestures-20-
led to a tangible cooperation that deserves the label 'corporatist', at least until well
into the 1960s.
Neither does it mean that unions persistently opposed any major policy move towards
capital formation and growth which did not fit straight into their programmatic
framework. E.g., the generous tax allowances for capital formation to repair war-
damaged equipment, which were granted to firms early on as an investment incentive
to compensate for the punitively high taxation imposed by the Allies, were criticised
from the union side, but not rejected out of hand, although a clear political preference
was expressed for more encompassing investment planning by the government; and
the later stepwise corporate and personal tax reductions by and large received the




My interpretation does mean, however, that - in a fundamental sense - the punch line
of post-war West German economic policy until well into the 1960s was determined
by a conservative/liberal establishment without a significant union participation and,
to a large extent, against persistent union opposition. Other reasons than a 'tripartite
corporatist effort' must be sought for to explain the apparent wage moderation and the
concomitant persistently high profit margins of the private sector of the German
economy. I have given the rough outline of such an explanation in other recent papers
and will not repeat it here.
3
4 Suffice it to say that my explanation classifies German-
style unionism and collective bargaining as a passive rigidity (rather than an active
agent!), which - through familiar insider/outsider mechanisms - transformed powerful
positive (and non-anticipated) productivity shocks that emanated above all from the
trade re-integration of Europe into a 'miracle' of employment growth. In this sense,
unions were effectively overrun by the positive events: they played an almost
3
3 For accounts of West German tax policy in the 1950s, see Boss (1987), Giersch, Paque",
Schmieding (1992), pp. 79-80, and Wallich (1955), pp. 66-67.
3
4 See Paque (1993b), pp. 15-22, and Paque" (1994), pp. 26-52.unwillingly moderate role in the process and found themselves increasingly 'deserted'
by a rank-and-file (and a general public including the non-unionised workforce)
which saw not much reason in violent strike action because real wages were growing
very fast anyway.
The isolation., in which the West German union movement began to find itself by the
mid 1950s was thus precisely the result of their becoming an ideological anachro-
nism, just like their political counterpart, the Social Democratic Party, which slid into
the same type of identity crisis about at the same time. Not before the end of a
protracted process of ideological transformation, which lasted roughly one decade,
did West German unions and the Social Democratic Party stand ready for genuine
corporatist dealings. It was this transformation which finally brought West German
collective bargaining and economic policy making much closer to the examples that
smaller European countries, notably the much admired Scandinavian ones, had given
already in the 1950s. By that time, however, most of the post-war growth miracle was
already coming to a close.-22-
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Source: Maddison (1991), Table B.4 and C.I 1.-23-
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wage level defined as average gross yearly earnings of employees (including so-
cial security contributions of employers);
(2) LP:= Labour productivity defined as gross domestic product at constant
vided by active labour force;
(3) PC-
(4) PV =
= private consumption deflator;
= deflator of value added (i.e. gross domestic product);
(5) PV/PC = ratio of PV to PC as defined in note to (4) and (3) respectively;




Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; own calculations.-25-
Figure 1: Wage Distance and Wage Drift,
West Germany 1951 - 90*
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